INTRODUCTION
Enterprise A is organized in Los Angeles, California. The enterprise runs a lucrative money laundering scheme facilitated by its ironclad grip over municipal officials. Enterprise A directs hundred of its associates to engage in extortion, bribery, arson, and a massive level of fraud involving the forceful corruption of local businesses into dummy operations through which the enterprise launders illegally obtained funds.
Enterprise B, also organized in Los Angeles, California, enjoyed a profitable tenure controlling the city's shipping industry until two of its associates defected to form Enterprise A. Because of the violence erupting between the two rival factions, Enterprise B cut its losses and relocated to Mexico City, Mexico, where several of its leaders maintained close ties. From Mexico's sheltered shores, Enterprise B continues to launder over $50 million annually through Los Angeles banks, enjoys a significant profit of illegally obtained funds totaling over $10 million, and continues to cause unquantifiable collateral damage to the local Los Angeles economy. Despite the certain destruction caused by Enterprise B, instability in the interpretation and application of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 1 (RICO) raises the possibility that Enterprise B will never be brought to justice.
RICO, a central feature of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 2 (OCCA), is a powerful weapon used to combat dangerous enterprises. RICO was enacted in response to organized crime's grip on American society, which, unrestrained by traditional law enforcement methods and legal remedies, siphoned billions of dollars from the American economy. 3 Since its inception, RICO has been used to take down the American Mafia 4 -the statute's original target-and, more recently, 5 it has been used against an impressive range of defendants including street gangs like the Latin Kings, 6 legitimate businesses, 7 and social organizations such as prolife activists. 8 But globalization and the rise of transnational dealings have thrown a wrench into RICO's omnipotence. 9 These modern phenomena have changed the face of organized crime: now, RICO enterprises orchestrate cross-border schemes and capitalize on technological innovations to orchestrate dispersed factions under the guise of complete anonymity. 10 In turn, RICO litigation has shifted shape, forcing courts to confront cases involving foreign elements and decide when, if ever, a court may hear a RICO claim involving foreign conduct-when is a RICO case too far removed from American soil to be decided by an American court?
The tumultuous aftermath of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. 11 has further complicated RICO's application, resulting in an attack on the statute's extraterritorial reach. 12 This decision, reviving the presumption against extraterritoriality for every 888-90 (1985) . The significance of this doctrine has grown recently due to the prevalence of global organizations and corporate entities, as well as rising foreign investment and trade. Id. at 888. federal statute, has caused immense upheaval in the RICO context as courts struggle to apply Morrison's binary framework to the multifaceted RICO statute and, consequently, employ divergent approaches to determine RICO's reach. 13 While courts agree that RICO is silent as to its extraterritorial application, 14 the battle lines are drawn from the outset, with parties and courts alike disputing how to determine when a RICO case involving domestic and foreign elements is impermissibly extraterritorial. Three distinct methods have emerged to measure RICO's reach: (1) the "enterprise approach," pinpointing the location of the RICO enterprise as a way to determine when a case is sufficiently domestic; (2) the "predicate offenses approach," looking to the location of these offenses; and (3) the "pattern of racketeering activity approach," considering the location of the actions committed by the enterprise as a whole. 15 Adding to this confusion, the Second Circuit has unilaterally held that RICO does in fact apply extraterritorially to the extent that its predicate offenses reach foreign conduct. 16 These irreconcilable approaches render uncertain whether RICO enterprises directing operations on U.S. soil from the safe haven of foreign countries-such as Enterprise B discussed above-will be brought to justice for the destruction they cause to the American people and the economy.
This Note delves into RICO's evolution, its judicial interpretation in the context of extraterritoriality, and the various approaches taken by courts applying Morrison to the RICO context. 17 Part I provides an overview of RICO's legislative history, the resulting statutory framework, and an analysis of the Morrison decision. Part II dissects the approaches taken by courts applying Morrison to the RICO context, including the split within the Second Circuit. Ultimately, this Note advocates an alternative approach in Part III that faithfully applies the Morrison framework while embodying RICO's core legislative intent.
See infra Part II (discussing the various approaches used by courts undergoing the Morrison analysis).
14. Ct. 28 (2015) (granting certiorari in the merits case); see also infra Part II.B (discussing RJR Nabisco III in detail).
17. There is significant scholarship examining RICO's application in a post-Morrison world. This Note aims to pick up where these efforts left off by first considering the most recent RICO jurisprudence, particularly that produced by the Second Circuit, and then by synthesizing the totality of approaches taken by courts applying Morrison to the RICO context.
I. TRACING RICO'S ORIGINS TO ITS MODERN STATE:
RICO'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, THE STATUTE, AND THE PROBLEM OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY This part first discusses RICO's legislative origins and the resulting statutory provisions. An understanding of RICO's legislative history is essential to resolving the question of RICO's extraterritoriality in light of Morrison's congressional intent-based inquiry. 18 This part then analyzes the Morrison decision and its progeny, which breathed new life into the presumption against extraterritoriality for all federal statutes-including RICO.
A. Exposing Organized Crime in America: RICO's Legislative History
By the 1950s, twenty-four organized crime syndicates, with over 5000 permanent members-and thousands more associates lying in wait across the country-threatened to disrupt the American economy and safety of the American people. 19 Initially, collective skepticism about the very existence of crime syndicates operating on a national level allowed these organizations to prosper unrestrained by traditional law enforcement methods. 20 Finally, Congress launched a series of investigations to unearth the existence of and explore the nature of these networks. 21 Chief among these congressional efforts were the findings produced by the Kefauver Senate Committee, 22 which concluded publicly for the first time that crime syndicates had organized on a national level and were devastating the American economy through infiltration, a novel form of criminal activity 18 where "criminals and racketeers [use] the profits of organized crime to buy up and operate legitimate business enterprises." 23 This activity signified a drastic shift from "traditional revenue raising activities such as gambling and prostitution" to "legitimate business activities." 24 The report further revealed that nearly every business sector had succumbed to this parasitic activity, including bedrock industries such as advertising, banking, insurance, and oil, as well as small scale businesses such as florists, restaurants, and hotels. 25 Spurred into action by these unnerving findings, President Lyndon B. Johnson established the Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice ("the Commission"), which then issued a task report 26 that later served as RICO's blueprint. 27 Instead of adopting the traditional focus of preventing the individual crimes committed 28 by such organizations, this report focused on the highly organized nature of the crime syndicate. 29 Additionally, the report devoted significant attention 30 to the infiltration of legitimate business as the immediate threat posed by these newly discovered networks. 31 This focus on infiltration was later adopted by RICO's drafters 32 28. Echoing the findings of the Kefauver Committee, the Commission discussed activities traditionally associated with organized crime, such as gambling and loansharking, and also focused on infiltration of legitimate businesses. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 26, at 188-90.
29. Id. at 188-91. In an overlapping discussion of how to define organized crime, the Commission acknowledged the possibility of, but ultimately rejected, a definitional approach that would focus solely on the prohibited activities committed by such organizations. Id. This initial discussion foreshadowed a significant obstacle for RICO's drafters, one that is particularly relevant to determining RICO's extraterritoriality. See infra Part III.A (discussing how to determine RICO's "focus" in light of its complex legislative history).
30. See Lynch, supra note 27, at 669-70 (noting that infiltration was afforded "the same space and weight . . . as the more traditional problem of the specifically criminal activities of organized crime").
31. 38 Congress directed OCCA broadly at "the eradication of organized crime in the United States" and aimed RICO more narrowly on attacking the problem of infiltration of legitimate businesses. 39 To accomplish this objective, Congress armed RICO with novel statutory provisions to overcome ineffective legal and law enforcement methods, emphasizing that "[t]he arrest, conviction, and imprisonment of a Mafia lieutenant can curtail operations, but does not put the syndicate out of business. As long as . . . organized crime remains, new leaders will step forward." 40 RICO thus represented a novel approach to "deal not only with individuals, but also with the economic base through which those individuals constitute such a serious threat to the economic well-being of the Nation. . . . [A]n attack must be made on their source of economic power itself." 41 Despite Congress's ambitions, RICO was not utilized against organized crime as intended for close to two decades. 43 Today however, RICO's broad language and tantalizing damages provisions 44 have transformed the once seldom-invoked statute into a key player in modern litigation, earning its nickname as "the litigation equivalent of a thermonuclear device." 45 
B. The Mechanics of the Statute
Although RICO has been referred to as a statute of "daunting complexity," 46 the statute's structure, organized over eight discrete sections, belies this description. 47 RICO's operative section sets forth four substantive offenses aimed at enterprise criminality, at least one of which is required for liability. 48 At its core, a RICO violation requires (1) a person participating in (2) a pattern of racketeering activity (3) in connection with the acquisition, maintenance, conduct, or control of an enterprise. 49 1. RICO's Operative Section: § 1962's Prohibitions Congress created four substantive offenses prohibiting forms of enterprise activity, each of which involves "a pattern of racketeering activity" and an "enterprise." 50 First, § 1962(a) prohibits investing or using income derived from "a pattern of racketeering activity" in any enterprise, 51 while § 1962(b) prohibits acquiring or maintaining an interest in an enterprise "through a pattern of racketeering activity." 52 Next, § 1962(c) 53 prohibits participating in or conducting the activities of an enterprise through "a pattern of racketeering activity," and § 1962(d) prohibits conspiring to violate any of the previous three subsections. 54 43. During the first decade of its inception, referred to as its "dormant" period, only nine RICO cases were decided in the district courts. ARTHUR F. MATHEWS ET AL., REPORT OF Rather than focus on already-unlawful activities or prohibit the very existence of the criminal association, 55 Congress chose to make certain activities unlawful in relation to the enterprise. 56 That each substantive offense aligns with conduct associated with the enterprise's infiltration activities reflects Congress's focus on this connection: § 1962(a) corresponds to purchasing an enterprise with dirty money; § 1962(b) is aimed at preventing the acquisition of an enterprise through means of overt racketeering activity; and § 1962(c) seeks to prevent those employed by or associated with an enterprise from further participating in the enterprise's activities through unlawful racketeering conduct. 57 This focus on infiltration activities in connection with an enterprise, rather than on the criminal entity, has facilitated RICO's broad application to conduct and enterprises beyond the Italian American Mafia's infiltration of American business-the original impetus for the statute's enactment. 58 
RICO's Central Concepts
Every RICO violation contains at least two common elements: an enterprise and a pattern of racketeering activity. 59 The statute provides definitions of these terms-and others central to RICO liability-which are discussed in this section.
a. Enterprise
"Enterprise" is defined as "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." 60 Free from restrictive language 61 and limiting provisions, courts have broadly interpreted "enterprise" to include Mafia organizations like the Gambino family and La Cosa Nostra, 62 illegitimate and legitimate associations, 63 and less traditional 55. Drafting this aspect of the statute presented a challenge: if the statute prohibited actions committed by a specified group, the statute could be subject to constitutional challenges for violating the deeply embedded precept that criminal prohibitions should apply only in general terms. Furthermore, a statute that prohibited actions committed by a particular group might narrow its application to only the group originally specified. predicate acts. 74 Accordingly, the Supreme Court described the pattern aspect as RICO's "key requirement." 75 In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 76 the Supreme Court interpreted this requirement and found that, more than merely "sporadic activity," a "pattern of racketeering activity" requires a showing of "continuity plus relationship." 77 This observation, however, was mere dicta appearing in a single footnote and failed to set forth a test for lower courts to apply this newly announced "continuity" requirement. 78 The Supreme Court later clarified this confusion in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. 79 Grounding its holding on RICO's legislative history aimed squarely at infiltration and concerted enterprise activity, the Court held that the "pattern requirement" requires a showing of "continuity plus relationship," where the racketeering acts occur in a continuous manner 80 and are related to one another or to "some external organizing principle that renders [them] 'ordered' or 'arranged,'" as well as occurring in a continuous manner. 81 While there is still no bright-line test for the "pattern requirement," courts have embraced the more flexible approach advocated in H.J., Inc. that places infiltration activity at the forefront of the RICO litigation. 82
d. Affecting Interstate or Foreign Commerce
For RICO liability, the enterprise or pattern of racketeering activity must affect interstate or foreign commerce. 83 . Petitioner Sedima, a Belgian Corporation, alleged that respondent Imrex billed its corporation using inflated invoices with nonexistent expenses amounting to civil RICO violations. Id. at 483-84.
77. Id. The Court noted that the definition of a "pattern of racketeering activity" differs from the other definition provisions in § 1961 in that the "pattern" section uses the word "requires" as opposed to "means." Id. at 496 n.14. Thus, "The implication is that while two acts are necessary, they may not be sufficient." Id. conduct (without regard to the activities of each defendant's behavior) and have required only a de minimis effect on interstate or foreign commerce. 84 While RICO's commerce phrase could plausibly function as merely providing a jurisdictional hook, it is also possible that Congress-imbuing the phrase with substantive meaning-intended the phrase to authorize the statute's prohibition of any infiltration activity that affected interstate or foreign commerce. This latter interpretation-reaching any type of infiltration activity regardless of its geographic location-is supported by RICO's legislative history, which demonstrates a recurring concern with infiltration's detrimental effect on the American economy, American businesses, and even American investors. 85 Furthermore, earlier versions of RICO included a notably restrictive version of this commerce phrase that defined "foreign commerce" as "commerce between any State and any foreign country." 86 91 Congress intended these flexible provisions to address the traditional difficulties inherent to fighting criminal organizations, including the exacting procedural requirements and evidentiary burdens central to criminal proceedings. 92 private cause of action allow an individual citizen to join in the fight against organized crime without having to defeat the procedural protections afforded to criminal defendants. 93 Furthermore, the inclusion of treble damages reflects Congress's intention that RICO function as "a major new tool in extirpating the baneful influence of organized crime in our economic life." 94 The legislative history of this section reveals that Congress was primarily concerned with ensuring the availability of remedial provisions to those who suffered at the hands of criminal networks. 95 While debating this section, Representative Sam Steiger drove home this point:
It is the intent of this body . . . to see that innocent parties who are the victims of organized crime have a right to obtain proper redress. . . . It represents the one opportunity for those of us who have been seriously affected by organized crime activity to recover. 96 Furthermore, the remedial treble damages provision was explicitly formed in the likeness of the antitrust laws, 97 which the Supreme Court has found "seek[] primarily to enable an injured competitor to gain compensation for that injury." 98
C. Extraterritorial Application of Federal Statutes
Part I.C.1 discusses RICO's extraterritorial reach before the Supreme Court's decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. Part I.C.2 then explores the Morrison decision, its progeny, and the policy underlying these rulings.
Initial Challenges and the Impending Crash
Before the Supreme Court drew a boundary limiting the reach of all federal statutes, 99 federal courts wrestled with RICO cases involving foreign defendants engaging in domestic racketeering activity or cases implicating foreign racketeering activity committed by domestic enterprises. 100 Faced with such hybrid cases, some courts held that RICO 93. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). Specifically, a private citizen must only meet the preponderance of the evidence standard, as opposed to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, and is also at liberty to take advantage of the more liberal discovery process in civil actions. 101 In place of this bright-line standard, other courts borrowed two tests from the securities and antitrust context-the "conducts test" and the effects test-to evaluate whether sufficient domestic effects or domestic conduct material to the racketeering activity had been alleged. 102 Additionally, the Second Circuit employed a narrow version of the conducts test, allowing a RICO complaint to survive dismissal provided that the domestic conduct alleged was material to the completion of the racketeering scheme and was a direct cause of the RICO injury. 103 Further muddying the waters, the Ninth Circuit integrated the conducts and effects tests to find that RICO liability may attach as long as a RICO plaintiff alleges some racketeering activity affecting interstate commerce within the United States. 104 Courts will continue to face questions about RICO's ever-expanding application-fostering uncertainty for both RICO plaintiffs and potential defendants-for several reasons. First, RICO's unfettered language 105 and incentivizing remedies have facilitated the statute's evolution into a prosecutorial powerhouse, now frequently invoked against a broad spectrum of defendants reaching even the tobacco industry and the Catholic Church. 106 Second, increasing global economic interdependence and the rise of transnationalism have encouraged the proliferation of multinational corporations, thereby raising the likelihood that an organization defending a RICO claim will touch on foreign elements. 107 Third, RICO enterprises "perceiving United States extraterritorial jurisdiction as a threat," including "statutes that block enforcement of foreign laws, regulations, or court orders").
101 similarly capitalize on globalized infrastructure 108 -including the convenience and anonymity offered by the internet-to coordinate global conduct and perpetuate criminal activities such as electronic financial transfers. 109 The simultaneous evolution of RICO's broad application and the increasingly global specter of both legitimate and illegitimate business operations ensure that courts will increasingly face RICO complaints involving extraterritorial elements. Against this tempestuous background, RICO plaintiffs must now confront the revived presumption against extraterritoriality applicable to all federal statutes-including RICO-as resurrected by the Supreme Court in Morrison.
The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality for All Federal Statutes
In Morrison, the Supreme Court responded to courts applying federal statutes to hybrid cases implicating foreign conduct with a bright-line standard. 110 Concluding that section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act ("the 1934 Act") does not apply extraterritorially, the Court affirmed the Second Circuit's dismissal 111 of a putative class action lawsuit against National Australia Bank ("National"). 112 As a threshold matter, 113 the Court revived the canon of construction against extraterritoriality, 114 elevating it to a presumption applicable to every federal statute. 115 This reaffirmed presumption mandates that all federal statutes will be presumed to be without extraterritorial application 108 . See Otey, supra note 107, at 46 ("The current world climates offers criminal organizations new avenues and a wider berth to ply their odious trades, which enables them to simultaneously operate in disparate and diverse countries in ways they never could before.").
109 112. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 273. Plaintiffs, Australian investors, brought an action for fraud arising from securities transactions made on foreign exchanges where investors purchased National's shares shortly before a series of write-downs. Id. at 252-53. Plaintiffs alleged that National purchased HomeSide, a Florida mortgage services company, and thereafter publicized HomeSide's success through misleading statements and manipulated its financial models to artificially enhance HomeSide's value. Id. at 252. Plaintiffs alleged that just a few months later, National wrote down the value of HomeSide's assets by over $2 billion, causing a significant fall in National's shares. Id. 113. Before arriving at the merits, the Court clarified the Second Circuit's earlier decision by emphasizing that a statute's extraterritoriality is a question of failure to state a claim, as opposed to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 254-55.
114. The Court noted that this canon reflects the "longstanding principle of American law 'that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.'" Id. at 255 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) In an attempt to avoid falling victim to the presumption against extraterritoriality, the petitioners and the solicitor general advanced three arguments. 119 Responding to the first contention that Congress's inclusion of the definition of "interstate commerce" 120 amounted to sufficient congressional indication for the statute to reach foreign conduct, the Court held that "[t]he general reference to foreign commerce in the definition of 'interstate commerce' does not defeat the presumption against extraterritoriality." 121 The Court similarly rejected the contention that section 10(b) was rendered applicable extraterritorially by virtue of the statute's general reference to "the United States and foreign countries," 122 concluding that "this fleeting reference" to where prices are quoted cannot overcome this presumption. 123 Finally, the Court rejected the position that section 30(a)'s provisions making specified sections of the 1934 Act applicable to foreign conduct 124 rendered section 10(b) generally applicable extraterritorially. 125 After decisively concluding that section 10(b) cannot overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality, the Court confronted an additional obstacle: whether the complaint in fact required an impermissibly extraterritorial application of section 10(b). 127 Conceding that "it is a rare case of prohibited extraterritorial application that lacks all contact with the territory of the United States," the Court instructed that, in such hybrid cases, additional analysis is required because the presumption against extraterritoriality is not "self-evidently dispositive." 128 Thus, when a statute cannot overcome the presumption, lower courts must discern its legislative "focus" to determine whether the case involves sufficient domestic conduct to survive dismissal. 129 Because "the object of the statute's solicitude" 130 may only apply domestically in these cases, Morrison's second prong protects the reaffirmed presumption against extraterritoriality from devolving into "a craven watchdog . . . retreat[ing] to its kennel whenever some domestic activity is involved." 131 Applying the focus test to section 10(b), the Court first turned to the 1934 Act's plain language and concluded that the statute regulated only domestic securities listed on domestic exchanges. 132 Similarly, the Court concluded that the 1934 Act's structure, specifically referencing section 30(a)-(b)'s instructions for the 1934 Act to reach foreign conduct in limited situations, reaffirmed the 1934 Act's overall inapplicability to extraterritorial transactions. 133 The Court also gleaned support from related legislation passed by the same Congress, which explicitly focused on domestic transactions. 134 Furthermore, the Court noted that if Congress had intended the 1934 Act to apply extraterritorially, it would have addressed the ensuing conflicts with foreign laws because of the obvious "probability of incompatibility with the applicable laws of other countries." 135 Synthesizing the findings produced by its two-prong inquiry, the Court concluded that section 10(b) could not apply to the foreign transactions 127 alleged because section 10(b) was devoid of congressional indication sufficient to overturn the presumption against extraterritoriality. 136 Furthermore, the Court found that section 10(b), focused on domestic transactions, could not apply to the case at hand where the domestic conduct alleged was only tangentially related to the transactions section 10(b) otherwise seeks to regulate. 137 Three years later, the Supreme Court affirmed the Morrison framework in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. 138 139 Applying the first prong of the Morrison framework, the Court considered whether the statute's plain language or legislative history could rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality. 140 Finding nothing in the statute to overcome this presumption, the Court then applied Morrison's second prong and concluded that, because "all the relevant conduct took place outside the United States," the case was impermissibly extraterritorial. 141 The Supreme Court's treatment of the presumption against extraterritoriality, first resurrected in Morrison and then reaffirmed in Kiobel, reflects an emerging trend to dismiss foreign-cubed 142 cases where a foreign plaintiff alleges violations committed by a foreign defendant in a federal court of the United States. Lurking behind this development is the position that fragile policy questions in the realm of international relations are best left to Congress's unique capabilities and vantage point. 143 Thus, Morrison's first prong, mandating the application of the presumption against extraterritoriality absent clear congressional indication otherwise, restricts the judiciary's involvement in traditionally legislative matters, thereby "serv[ing] to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord. Id. at 1669. Specifically, the Court noted that "even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application. Corporations are often present in many countries, and it would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence suffices." Id.
(citation omitted).
142. The term "foreign-cubed" refers to cases in which (1) a foreign plaintiff sues (2) a foreign defendant for violating American laws based on conduct occurring (3) in a foreign country. See, e.g., Morrison, 561 U.S. at 283 n.11 (Stevens, J., concurring The Norex decision arises from a backdrop fitting for an international spy thriller: the complaint details an ambitious racketeering and money laundering scheme perpetuated to seize a substantial portion of the Russian oil industry. 152 Just three months after the Supreme Court issued its Morrison ruling, the Southern District of New York applied the newly revived presumption against extraterritoriality and dismissed the alleged RICO violations as impermissibly extraterritorial. 153 On appeal, petitioner Norex maintained that RICO's predicate offenses, some of which contained explicit extraterritorial reach, were sufficient to overcome Morrison's presumption against extraterritoriality. 154 The Second Circuit did not bite and instead affirmed the dismissal, 155 categorically concluding that RICO cannot apply extraterritorially because "RICO is silent as to any extraterritorial application." 156 Sidestepping the required analysis regarding RICO's congressional intent, 157 the Second Circuit instead borrowed from Morrison's findings to summarily reject Norex's argument that RICO's reference to "interstate or foreign commerce" was sufficient congressional intent to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality. 158 
S.C. § 1962(a)-(c) (2012).
Additionally, the language used in the RICO statute-prohibiting racketeering associated with "any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce"-differs from the "interstate commerce" phrase discussed in 159. Norex, 631 F.3d at 33. The Second Circuit's analysis of this aspect of petitioner's argument is confined to one explanatory parenthetical that briefly references the Supreme Court's decision in Morrison in which the Court rejected an argument that, because an RICO's congressional intent, the Second Circuit then concluded that "the slim contacts with the United States alleged by Norex are insufficient to support extraterritorial application of the RICO statute." 160 The Second Circuit's Norex decision skirted the Morrison analysis: the panel failed to determine whether RICO contains congressional intent powerful enough to overcome the presumption against extraterritorialityMorrison's first prong. The Second Circuit also avoided discerning whether the court need only apply the statute domestically by discerning RICO's focus-Morrison's second prong. Despite this anemic analysis, many courts have since cited Norex's conclusion, regarding RICO's lack of congressional indication sufficient to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality, in lieu of analyzing the statute as mandated by the Morrison ruling. 161 
A. The Enterprise Approach
The enterprise approach is one method employed by courts determining whether a RICO case is sufficiently domestic under the Morrison framework. In Cedeño v. Intech Group, Inc., 162 a private Venezuelan citizen sued a group of Venezuelan government officials and their associates, alleging a lucrative scheme to launder funds obtained by "fraud, extortion, and private abuse of public authority" through American banks. 163 In determining whether the complaint should be dismissed as impermissibly foreign, the court first found that RICO's focus was the "enterprise as the recipient of, or cover for, a pattern of criminal activity." 164 In support of this finding, the court emphasized RICO's broad purpose, emphasizing: "RICO is not a recidivist statute designed to punish someone for committing a pattern of multiple criminal acts. Rather, it prohibits the use of such a pattern to impact an enterprise [through RICO's operative section]." 165 Thus concluding that RICO's focus is the enterprise, 166 because "RICO does not apply where, as here, the alleged enterprise and the impact of the predicate activity upon it are entirely foreign." 167 Similarly centering on the RICO enterprise alleged, a court in the Southern District of New York dismissed RICO claims stemming from an alleged global money laundering scheme as impermissibly extraterritorial. 168 Undergoing Morrison's focus inquiry, the district court concluded that "[b]ecause the 'focus' of RICO is the 'enterprise,' a RICO 'enterprise' must be a 'domestic enterprise.'" 169 The lower court then applied the "nerve center" test 170 to determine the geographic location of the enterprise and thus pinpointed the enterprise's "'brains,' that is, where the [enterprise's] decisions are made, as opposed to the 'brawn,' that is, how the [enterprise] acts." 171 Using this test, the court found that the enterprise, controlled by Russian and Colombian narcotics gangs and European currency exchange brokers engaging in foreign transactions, was located abroad and thus dismissed the RICO complaint. 172 The enterprise approach-and its borrowed nerve center test-is not without criticism.
Some have noted that this approach is overly simplistic 173 and that the nerve center test loses its value when applied to RICO enterprises, which often are dispersed, shadowy, and international in nature. 174 
B. The Predicate Offenses Approach
The predicate offenses approach is an alternative method used to determine RICO's extraterritoriality. Part II.B.1 discusses this approach as used by courts undergoing Morrison's second prong, the focus inquiry. Part II.B.2 then explores the Second Circuit's expansive version of this approach, which allowed the court to conclude that RICO contains sufficient congressional intent to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality.
The Standard Method
In CGC Holding Co. v. Hutchens, 176 a Colorado district court, endorsing the predicate offenses approach, looked to the location of the RICO predicate offenses allegedly committed by Canadian defendants in furtherance of a fraudulent loan scheme to determine whether the complaint was insufficiently domestic. 177 Denying the motion to dismiss, the court found that "the racketeering activity . . . was directed at and largely occurred within the United States." 178 In support of this finding, the court contrasted the facts of the scheme alleged with those in Norex and Cedeño, "where the actors, victims [,] and conduct were foreign, and the connection to the United States was essentially incidental." 179 Thus, by pinpointing the location of the predicate offenses alleged in the complaint, the predicate offenses approach allowed the court to neatly conclude that the case at bar was sufficiently domestic to survive dismissal. 180 
The Second Circuit Twist and the Resulting Intracircuit Split
Embracing the predicate offenses approach, the Second Circuit held for the first time that, by incorporating offenses with express extraterritorial application as racketeering activity within the statute, Congress unequivocally indicated that RICO may in fact reach extraterritorial conduct. 181 Plaintiffs, the European Community and twenty-six of its member states (EC), alleged that RJR Nabisco directed a global scheme to smuggle cigarettes and launder money by engaging in racketeering activities including wiring illicitly obtained funds to RJR in the United Second, the decision created an intracircuit split by diverging from its earlier Norex decision, which both explicitly rejected the predicate offenses approach as well as unambiguously held that RICO has no extraterritorial application. 185 While the split in the Second Circuit is not central to resolving RICO's reach in that the controversy centers mainly on the propriety of the predicate offenses approach, this intracircuit tension is nevertheless significant to RICO jurisprudence and cannot be ignored in light of the Supreme Court's impending decision. 186 Before extending RICO's reach, the Second Circuit first criticized the lower court's interpretation of its Norex ruling in an attempt to retrospectively limit this categorical precedent, thereby making room for the decisions to coexist. 187 To achieve this maneuver, the Second Circuit emphasized that the lower court had misconstrued Norex's expansive language-"RICO is silent as to any extraterritorial application" 188 -to incorrectly mean that RICO can never have extraterritorial reach in any of its applications. 189 Instead, the Second Circuit retrospectively announced that this finding merely indicates that RICO cannot apply extraterritorially in every application. 190 Having attempted to distance its ruling from Norex's categorical language, the Second Circuit then reached the first prong of the Morrison 194 Based on this analysis, the panel reinstated the EC's claims, thus extending RICO liability to foreign racketeering activity, and asserted that "[w]hen . . . a RICO charge is based on an incorporated predicate that manifests Congress's clear intention to apply extraterritorially, the presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. statutes is overcome." 195 Further extending the predicate offenses approach, the Second Circuit held that RICO reaches foreign enterprises so long as they are shown to engage in predicate offenses containing explicit extraterritorial instructions. 196 With limited support or explanation, the panel reasoned that restricting RICO to only domestic enterprises would erode Congress's explicit instructions for predicate offenses to apply extraterritorially in the event that a RICO enterprise was found to be foreign. 197 To protect against the catastrophic consequence of "giving foreigners carte blanche to violate the laws of the United States in the United States," 198 the panel concluded that it was "far more reasonable to make the extraterritorial application of RICO coextensive with the extraterritorial application of the relevant predicate statutes." 199 With no other textual support, the panel maintained that its holding would allow courts to consistently analyze when conduct is actionable and protect against "incongruous results" that would otherwise 191 arise if wholly domestic activity was shielded from liability "simply because the defendant has acted in concert with a foreign enterprise." 200 Turning to the predicate offenses alleged in the complaint, the court noted that it need not "decide precisely how to draw the line between domestic and extraterritorial applications" of the predicate offenses alleged because "the conduct alleged here clearly states a domestic cause of action." 201 In response to the predicate offenses of money laundering and material support of terrorism, the panel concluded that RICO reaches these foreign activities because both predicate offenses contain explicit extraterritorial instructions. 202 Next, the panel held that while the predicate offenses of mail fraud, wire fraud, and Travel Act violations were silent regarding their extraterritorial application, the EC had alleged sufficient domestic conduct to survive dismissal. 203 Thereafter, petitioners sought rehearing on the grounds that the panel had left unanswered the question of whether, regardless of the geographic reach of § 1962, civil plaintiffs bringing an action under § 1964(c) were required to allege a domestic injury. 204 The panel asserted that, because the statute does not require a showing of a domestic injury, § 1964(c) also applies to extraterritorial injuries to the extent that predicate offenses with clear foreign application have been alleged. 205 In support of this conclusion, the panel explained that Morrison's presumption against extraterritoriality is "primarily concerned with the question of what conduct falls within a statute's purview." 206 These decisions produced a divisive intracircuit split because the panel strayed from the Norex precedent as to (a) whether RICO contains sufficient congressional indication for the statute to overcome Morrison's rebuttable presumption through the incorporation of predicate offenses and (b) whether RICO's focus is the RICO enterprise or the RICO predicate offenses required for liability. Moreover, in allowing RICO to reach conduct, enterprises, and even injuries occurring outside the territorial United States by looking solely to RICO's predicate offenses, the Second Circuit diverged from every court applying Morrison to RICO claims. 207 
The Second Circuit Chooses Permanent Instability:
Solidifying the Second Circuit's Expansive Predicate Offenses Approach
In an 8-to-5 decision, the Second Circuit denied RJR's bid for an en banc rehearing-choosing instead to preserve its decision rendering RICO's extraterritorial application coextensive with its predicate offenses. 208 In October 2015, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to resolve the split created by the court's expansive predicate offenses approach. 209 
a. Judge Hall's Concurring Opinion
Writing to deny rehearing, Judge Hall concluded that the Second Circuit was "sound" in both its interpretation of RICO and its broad application of the predicate offenses approach. 210 Judge Hall first emphasized that the panel's decision was faithful to Morrison in its conclusion that RICO's "predicate offenses," containing explicit congressional intention to reach foreign conduct, overcame the rebuttable presumption against extraterritoriality. 211 Next, Judge Hall tackled the tension posed by the panel's earlier Norex decision, which broadly concluded that RICO cannot reach foreign conduct because the "statute is silent as to any extraterritorial application." 212 Just as the Second Circuit panel had one year earlier, 213 Judge Hall restricted Norex's broad holding to mean that "RICO's clear manifestation of intent that some of its provisions apply to foreign conduct permits extraterritorial application of RICO in those situations, but does not justify" the statute's extraterritorial application in every single instance. 214 In support of this rereading, Judge Hall merely concluded that interpreting Norex's holding as foreclosing RICO's extraterritorial application in every instance would be "flatly incorrect, or at least misleading," given that some of the predicate offenses contain references to extraterritorial conduct. 215 Similarly, Judge Hall reinterpreted Norex's rejection of the contention that RICO's predicate offenses render RICO applicable to foreign conduct as meaning that Morrison forecloses the extraterritorial application of RICO in every context based on these predicate offenses. 216 In support of this post hoc interpretation, Judge Hall summarily concluded that, if the sentence alternatively meant that RICO could never apply extraterritorially despite certain predicate offenses containing extraterritorial instructions, "one would wonder why the panel came to that conclusion" because "the assertion would cry out for further explanation." 217 As in the panel's earlier decision in the litigation, 218 Judge Hall thus retrospectively tethered Norex's broad language to the facts of the case in an attempt to alleviate the tension posed by these rulings.
b. Dissenting Opinions
The panel's opinions dissenting from the decision to deny rehearing illuminate the predicate offenses approach. 219 Judge Cabranes first wrote to emphasize that the panel's decision to preserve the predicate offenses approach would encourage an "end-run around the revivified presumption against extraterritoriality" by allowing courts to focus on Congress's intention in the statutes incorporated by reference (RICO's predicate offenses) instead of inquiring into Congress's intention as to RICO itself. 220 Judge Cabranes disagreed with this approach: "This reasoning conflates the question of whether RICO applies extraterritorially with whether the statute's definition of 'racketeering activity' includes predicate offenses that can be charged abroad." 221 Penning the lengthiest dissent, Judge Raggi argued that the majority's decision "untethers RICO from its mooring on United States shores and concludes, for the first time, that the statute reaches overseas . . . so long as one predicate act is alleged that references conduct that could be prosecuted under a criminal statute." 222 Turning first to the intracircuit conflict created by RJR Nabsico and Norex, 223 Judge Raggi explicitly disagreed with the majority's recasting 224 of Norex's "categorical" language and instead maintained that this language compelled the conclusion that RICO's predicate offenses may authorize extraterritorial jurisdiction "for prosecutions under the referenced proscribing criminal statutes, not for RICO claims alleging such predicates." 225 227 Refuting the Second Circuit's contention that ignoring certain predicate offenses' extraterritorial instructions would render meaningless Congress's decision to incorporate these offenses, Judge Raggi suggested that Congress may have referenced these offenses so that a civil plaintiff could satisfy the racketeering pattern requirement 228 by alleging a foreign predicate offense within an otherwise wholly domestic pattern of activity. 229 Next, Judge Raggi characterized the Second Circuit's concern that a "defendant associated with a foreign enterprise" could "escape liability for conduct that indisputably violates a RICO predicate" as "rais[ing] a false alarm" because the United States may rely on § 2332 to initiate such a prosecution. 230 Moving past these arguments, Judge Raggi then emphasized the need for rehearing "to clarify how courts should distinguish RICO's domestic and extraterritorial applications." 231 Now, RICO litigants in the Second Circuit are forced to make sense of a decision that at once proclaimed that RICO applies extraterritorially to the extent a claim alleges extraterritorial predicate offenses while simultaneously holding that the EC's RICO claims were sufficiently domestic because the EC alleged predicates that occurred domestically within the United States. 232 234 the Ninth Circuit endorsed the pattern of racketeering activity approach to determine RICO's reach in a multinational context. 235 In Chao Fan Xu, four Chinese nationals appealed their RICO convictions stemming from a global scheme to steal millions of dollars from the Bank of China and to evade prosecution through immigration fraud in the United States. 236 The first part of this scheme involved the defendants, employees at the Bank of China, engaging in various types of fraud, including speculating on foreign exchanges, that resulted in a loss of $147 million to the Bank of China. 237 Next, defendants entered into fraudulent marriages, falsified immigration documents, and fled to the United States with illegally obtained funds to evade Chinese law enforcement upon Bank of China's discovery of the fraudulent scheme. 238 Affirming the defendants' RICO convictions, 239 the Ninth Circuit found that the district court had properly applied RICO to the case at hand because a central portion of the convicted pattern of racketeering activity, RICO's focus, 240 was "executed and perpetuated in the United States." 241 Acknowledging that Morrison's focus inquiry is "far from clear-cut" in the RICO context, the Ninth Circuit noted that courts had divided into two distinct camps: one that maintained that the enterprise is RICO's focus and one that looked to the racketeering activity alleged. 242 The Ninth Circuit blurred RICO's boundary further and formed a third camp, emphasizing RICO's "pattern of racketeering activity"-the "heart of any RICO complaint"-as the proper metric to measure RICO's reach. 243 In support of this new approach, the court turned to RICO's legislative history, finding that it contained "express legislative intent to punish patterns of organized 234 criminal activity in the United States," 244 thus making it "highly unlikely that Congress was unconcerned with the actions of foreign enterprises where those actions violated the laws of this country while the defendants were in this country." 245 Further emphasizing the central role of this element, the court noted that each of RICO's operative sections prohibit activities conducted through or derived from "a pattern of racketeering activity." 246 Finally, the court noted that the enterprise approach, and its use of the nerve center test, was likely to produce "artificially simplified results" or to fail to provide a clear answer in less than clear-cut cases. 247 For example, if the court applied the enterprise approach to the case at bar, where the "brains" of the enterprise were located in Asia but the entire enterprise violated U.S. law, there would be "no necessary or . . . even probable connection between where the RICO enterprise makes its decisions and whether the application of RICO to the racketeering activity at issue . . . was the sort of activity with which Congress would have been concerned." 248 Thus settling on the pattern approach, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the defendants' convictions as falling within RICO's ambit because the second part of the enterprise's plan, occurring within the territorial United States, was essential to the success of the overall scheme. 249 Similarly, the district court in Chevron Corp. v 252 the court emphasized that this approach "would afford a remedy to a U.S. plaintiff who claims injury caused by domestic acts of racketeering activity without regard to the nationality or foreign character of the defendants or the enterprise." 253 The court further bolstered this approach by referencing RICO's legislative history, contending that RICO was intended to "protect[] American victims at least against injury caused by the conduct of the affairs of enterprises through patterns of racketeering activity that occur in this country." 254 The Chevron court then teased out the flaws inherent to the enterprise approach. 255 In particular, the court disagreed with the Cedeño court's contention that "RICO evidences no concern with foreign enterprises," finding this unlikely "if the prohibited [RICO] activities injured Americans in this country and occurred here," given that "foreign enterprises have been at the heart of precisely the sort of activities . . . that were exactly what Congress enacted RICO to eradicate." 256 Moreover, the court challenged the administrability of the enterprise approach, noting that importing the corporate jurisdictional nerve center test is "questionable" because, for example, RICO liability does not even require that the RICO enterprise is a "defendant charged with wrongdoing." 257 Following Chevron's pattern of racketeering activity approach, a D.C. federal district court in Hourani v. Mirtchev 258 dismissed as impermissibly foreign a RICO complaint because the pattern of racketeering activity occurred largely in Kazakhstan. 259 Citing Chao Fan Xu, the court found that "RICO's statutory language and legislative history support the notion that RICO's focus is on the pattern of racketeering activity." 260 Thus, looking to the pattern of racketeering activity alleged, the court dismissed the RICO violations and concluded that "the predicate acts that proximately caused Plaintiffs' injury . . . were squarely extraterritorial and therefore outside of RICO's reach." 261 
III. RESOLVING RICO'S REACH: A BETTER APPROACH
In Morrison's wake, turmoil abounds. While courts widely agree that RICO does not apply extraterritorially, they are deeply divided about what transforms a case into an impermissibly extraterritorial application of the RICO statute. 262 Adding to this confusion, the Second Circuit found that RICO contains congressional intent sufficient to rebut Morrison's presumption against extraterritoriality, thereby extending the statute for the first time to foreign enterprises engaged in foreign racketeering activity as well as to enterprises causing foreign injuries. 263 These conflicting approaches leave unanswered the question of whether those suffering at the hands of a RICO enterprise will obtain relief or, alternatively, whether international organizations will be hauled into U.S. courts. This instability is significant: RICO litigation is common in U.S. federal courts, 264 and its application continues to grow in breadth as courts consistently interpret RICO broadly, extending the statute far beyond La Cosa Nostra. 265 Moreover, approaches such as the unprecedented one championed by the Second Circuit 266 raise the possibility that legitimate businesses situated halfway around the world will face liability for acts committed on foreign soil without injuring an American citizen, transforming American courts into "the Shangri-La . . . for lawyers" all over the world. 267 Thus, RICO's instability threatens to bring to life the concerns that the Supreme Court hoped to guard against with Morrison's prophylactic framework. 268 
A. RICO's Focus
This Note concludes that a RICO case alleging either a domestic enterprise or a domestic pattern of racketeering activity is sufficiently domestic under Morrison's framework. 269 To reach this conclusion, this section exposes the flaws inherent to the predicate offenses approach, as well as the problems stemming from an approach centering solely on either the enterprise or the pattern of racketeering activity.
RICO's Dual Focus
Morrison mandates that courts discern the object of congressional solicitude when determining the extraterritorial application of an otherwise domestic statute. 270 But RICO's complex legislative history makes clear that this unique statute cannot be forced into Morrison's binary framework because unlike section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, RICO has more than just one singular focus. While section 10(b) centers on the domestic fraudulent transactions it expressly prohibits, 271 RICO prohibits conduct related to an enterprise as a proxy for accomplishing its principal concern: uprooting criminal organization's infiltration of the American economy. 272 Thus working by proxy to effectuate RICO's core purpose, Congress armed this multifaceted statute with two foci intended to be harnessed together in every RICO litigation: the pattern of racketeering activity and the enterprise. 273 Embracing both elements as the statute's twin foci recognizes these complexities and avoids castrating its efficacy.
RICO's legislative history underscores the central importance of both requirements. Constitutionally barred from prohibiting the existence of the Italian American mafia as an entity, 274 Congress resorted to prohibiting the activities, in connection with an enterprise, that are associated with such crime syndicates. 275 An approach that recognizes only one of these elements as RICO's focus ignores the fact that Congress prohibited racketeering in relation to the enterprise-instead of merely prohibiting the criminal enterprise or the pattern of racketeering activity itself. 276 Furthermore, RICO was explicitly enacted to promote "the eradication of organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime." 277 This statement unambiguously recognizes the pattern of racketeering activity ("unlawful activities") when related to RICO's enterprise ("those engaged in organized crime") as central to RICO's goal of combating organized crime. 278 280 In addition to the ample legislative and textual support for this dual focus approach, looking solely to the enterprise as RICO's focus would produce logistical consequences that are out of sync with the congressional intent at the heart of RICO's enactment. First, the enterprise approach would allow a criminal enterprise to avoid liability by relocating the enterprise's "brains" outside the United States while continuing to direct racketeering activity within the United States. 281 This approach fundamentally ignores RICO's core purpose: Congress broadly conceived of RICO as a measure to eradicate the harmful effects of infiltration as produced by all criminal syndicates-not just those situated domestically. 282 Moreover, foreign enterprises, such as La Cosa Nostra, 283 "have been at the heart of precisely the sort of activities-committed in the United States-that were exactly what Congress enacted RICO to eradicate." 284 Similarly, extending § 1962 to only cases involving domestic conduct and domestic enterprises would render meaningless those of RICO's predicate acts containing express extraterritorial application. 285 The fallibility of the enterprise approach is reinforced by the use of the nerve center test. 286 This test is ill-suited to the nontraditional associationsin-fact and amorphous ad hoc groups falling under RICO's reach. 287 These enterprises do not resemble corporations: RICO enterprises may have no structure, no hierarchy, no meetings or general procedures and, significantly, may direct operations from multiple locations simultaneously, all of which may equally be the "brain" and the "brawn." 288 Thus, because employing the nerve center test misapprehends the nature of RICO enterprises, this approach ultimately undermines Congress's intention to broadly protect American public safety and the American economy by reaching a myriad of enterprise associations. 289 
The Predicate Offenses Approach Is Wrong
It is contrary to Morrison's mandate and unfaithful to RICO's legislative history to employ an approach that identifies RICO's predicate offenses as its focus. This method ignores Congress's explicit warning that merely addressing the unlawful activities of an enterprise will fail to effectively eradicate organized crime and, instead, will encourage criminal networks to flourish as the legal enforcement scheme is left merely to pick off fungible cogs from the organized crime wheel. 290 Thus, the predicate offenses approach guts RICO from its core, reducing the statute to nothing more than the predicate offenses passively incorporated into the statute by reference.
In addition to overlooking RICO's core precepts, designating RICO's predicate offenses as the focus is incorrect for several further reasons. First, this approach mirrors the now-abrogated conduct test in directing courts to look to the geographical location of where the predicate offense was commissioned to determine whether the case is domestic or foreign in nature. 291 Next, the superficial simplicity of this method will encourage RICO plaintiffs merely toplead around this test to survive dismissal, cherrypicking which predicate offenses to allege based on the location of their commission. Furthermore, the predicate offenses approach encourages the very effects against which Morrison sought to zealously guard: allowing an entirely foreign-cubed case-where the defendants are foreign, the injury is foreign, and the pattern of racketeering activity is foreign-to survive dismissal as long as the RICO plaintiff alleges "magic" predicate offenses-offenses with explicit instructions to reach foreign conduct.
The Second Circuit's expansive version of this approach strays even further from RICO's legislative history and from the Morrison framework. The Second Circuit's predicate offenses approach directly conflicts with the Morrison framework, which directs courts to discern a statute's extraterritorial application by first discerning whether a statute contains affirmative congressional indication sufficient to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality. 292 RICO's predicate offenses, many of which were already in existence at the time of RICO's enactment, do not meet this standard: clear indication for RICO to apply extraterritorially cannot be indirectly inferred from Congress's passive incorporation of predicate overextending the already expansively applied statute. 304 Thus, a domestic injury requirement for § 1964(c) protects against conflicts between sovereign nations, which Morrison and Kiobel sought to guard against in resurrecting the presumption against extraterritoriality. 305 
CONCLUSION
Congress enacted RICO to protect American citizens and the American economy from the destruction caused by organized crime's infiltration of legitimate businesses. As the answer to the novel problem of infiltration, RICO offered effective evidence-gathering and enforcement tools as well as incentivized remedial provisions. 306 Despite Congress's explicit intention for RICO to apply broadly, courts in a post-Morrison world have significantly handicapped RICO's once extensive reach. Courts have almost unanimously agreed 307 that RICO's legislative history prohibits it from overcoming the revived presumption against extraterritoriality and thus have limited RICO's application by dismissing claims when a foreign enterprise or foreign pattern of racketeering activity is alleged. In light of the new face of organized crime-the transnational enterprise-these approaches dangerously stunt RICO's ability to adapt to the changing face of organized crime.
This Note advocates an alternative approach that embraces RICO's dual focus-the RICO enterprise and the pattern of racketeering activity-and concludes that a RICO claim is sufficiently domestic if it alleges either a domestic enterprise or a domestic pattern of racketeering activity. This alternative approach embraces Morrison's mandate while remaining true to RICO's core intent by refusing to conform the statute to Morrison's restrictive framework. Moreover, because this Note concludes that RICO's reach must be restricted to domestic injuries in the context of private actions, this Note faithfully embodies Morrison's desire to discourage the judiciary from wading unwelcome into the murky waters of foreign relations. 
